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Abstract 
 
 
Any complete theory of physical reality must allow for the ubiquitous phenomenon of 
subjective experience at some level, or risk being conceptually incoherent. However, as 
long as the ontological status of subjectivity itself remains unresolved, the topic will be 
seen as more within the purview of philosophy than of physics. Towards a resolution of 
this issue within empirically motivated physical theory, this article introduces an 
operational definition that utilizes the general consensus that subjective mental states, 
whatever else is controversial about them, at least correlate in some way to physical 
states. It is shown here that implementing this underappreciated assumption within the 
framework of a physical theory in fact leads to wide-ranging consequences. In particular, 
a correlation requires there exist a well-defined mapping from a space of subjective 
mental states onto a space of information-bearing states of some physical theory. Given 
the peculiar nature of subjective states as inherently private appearances, any empirical 
identification of states must be performed by the experiencing subject. It is argued that 
such an operationally defined ‗self-measuring‘ act leads unavoidably to an ‗uncertainty 
principle‘ that is analogous in some intriguing ways to Heisenberg's principle for 
quantum mechanics. A model is then introduced for subjective states as algorithmically 
incomputable numbers. Additionally, an inequality similar to Bell‘s theorem may be 
derived, indicating an analogy with the violations of local reality and the ontology of 
observables within quantum mechanics.  
  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ubiquitous phenomenon of private, subjective, mental experience has been well-
known for centuries to be maddeningly difficult to approach within the context of the 
natural sciences, indeed within any objective system of inquiry. Controversies persist no 
less today than in ancient times on the most basic of questions, beginning with the very 
explanandum itself. An equal lack of consensus exists regarding the causal role and 
ontological status of subjective, conscious experience in what appears to be an otherwise 
physical, material world. In a rather dry assessment from The International Dictionary of 
Psychology (Sutherland, 1989) we read about consciousness:  
 
It is impossible to specify what it is, what it does or why it evolved. Nothing worth 
reading has been written about it. 
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Of course, the utter lack of any real progress since the modern formulation of the problem 
by Descartes (Descartes, 1988) might be a sign that the problem simply has no real 
solution, or at least any type of solution that our minds would recognize as such 
(McGinn, 1989). In fact, if the mind-body problem does turn out one day to have any 
resolution, it seems likely to be bound by what we can think of as the Conservation of 
Absurdity rule: the total amount of absurdity in any logically consistent treatment of the 
mind-body problem is invariant with respect to transformations of methodology!  
 
Given the manifestly subjective and apparently ineffable nature of the subject matter, 
consciousness research, except in occasional connection with interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, has historically remained much less a topic in its own right within physics. 
Still, it may be said that understanding the nature and place of subjectivity within the 
physical world is not only the longest-standing open problem of the scientific revolution; 
in a way it is the open problem of open problems. The ultimate goal of physics, phrased 
in the broadest possible way, is to explain why we observe what we observe. Yet what 
meaning is there to an observed phenomenon without the subjective experience of 
observation? Objective explanations of the blueness of the sky in terms of Rayleigh 
scattering and the neurobiology of visual processing are satisfying up to a point, but 
ultimately we want an understanding of why we see the sky as blue. More importantly, 
any fundamental theory that excludes subjectivity is not only incomplete; it is ultimately 
unintelligible, for the simple reason that we can‘t meaningfully claim to conceive of a 
world that cannot be conceived of in the first place. So in the end, it seems necessary to 
understand subjectivity for a complete explanation of any natural phenomenon.  
 
 
2. THE HARD PROBLEM  
 
The most controversial and intractable aspect of subjectivity, and the one of ultimate 
interest here, is often referred to as the ‗Hard Problem‘ (Chalmers, 1995) of 
consciousness – as distinct from the other so-called ‗Easy Problems‘ of consciousness. In 
essence, the Easy Problems are all those which can be ultimately defined exclusively in 
terms of objectively observable data. This data can include everything from a subject‘s 
written and verbal utterances, images of facial and body movements, as well as fMRI, 
EEG scans, single neuron activity, and so on. Easy Problems also include questions of 
classical psychology, such as, e.g., ―Why did he choose chocolate?‖, or ―How will she 
react to the bad news?‖, because one can, at least in principle, conceive of physical, 
explanatory models to account for the objectively observed act of ‗choosing‘ and 
‗reacting‘. Choosing to define private, subjective mental states wholly in terms of what is 
objectively observable about them by third parties is the inspiration for the famous 
Turing Test (Turing, 1950) and subsequent work in artificial intelligence (AI). In 
particular, Turing imagined future computational models of the mind which could 
accurately mimic the observable output of the human mind. Such models would be 
considered solutions (albeit non-unique) to the Easy Problems.   
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By contrast, the Hard Problem, true to its name, already begins with the very attempt to 
state it. Because its formulation in objective terms as an unambiguous explanandum is 
highly nontrivial and controversial
1
, it is better got at by example: imagine you stub your 
toe and yell ―Ouch!‖ Explaining the complex causal chain of your reaction in physical 
terms is wholly an Easy Problem as described above, except for the nagging residual 
question: why did it actually hurt, indeed, why did stubbing your toe feel like anything at 
all? Why is information processing by nerve tissue accompanied by any private, first 
person sensation? Nowhere within the explanatory paradigm of physical causation, 
however computationally complex and rich in emergent phenomenon it may be, does the 
phenomenon of your private perspective appear. This point is often illustrated with the 
famous ‗zombie‘ thought experiment (Moody, 1994): Imagine an exact physical 
duplicate of yourself, atom for atom, with the single exception that your duplicate doesn‘t 
feel anything; a ‗zombie‘ of yourself. Being your exact physical duplicate, your zombie 
nevertheless behaves in ways indistinguishable from you under all conceivable physical 
circumstances. For example, your zombie yells ―Ouch!‖ with the identical neuro-
physiological activity after stubbing a toe as you do (and some zombies even write papers 
on the zombie thought experiment). In the context of Easy Problems there is no objective, 
measurable distinction between you and your zombie, but at the same time, by 
hypothesis, your zombie feels nothing, and has no subjective experience, whereas you do. 
These examples are intended to illustrate that from the point of view of any conceivable 
objective physical theory, subjective experience in the visceral sense of ‗what it feels like’ 
seems unexpected, mysterious and indeed superfluous.  
 
The Hard Problem itself is controversial, and some, such as Dennett (Dennett, 1984) and 
Hofstadter (Hofstadter, 1979) maintain that subjectivity is best seen not as a ‗real‘ 
phenomenon, but rather as a sort of emergent illusion of complex and self-referential 
information processing. However, it has been countered extensively by Chalmers 
(Chalmers, 1996) and many others that such a proposal merely skirts the true issue. 
Indeed, it seems manifestly incoherent to posit that experience itself is any kind of non-
experiential artifact. In a very direct sense, that fact of subjectivity seems to be the one 
observation we actually know with certainty. At issue in this dispute is more than 
semantics, but basic ontological perspective that impacts any theory of physical reality: in 
what sense is it meaningful to ascribe the notion of ‗existence‘ to our private sensations 
and first person perspectives, and how can they be related to our (apparently quite 
different) notion of existence in the physical universe?   
 
 
3. AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 
 
Framed in this basic way, one place to start might be to ask whether any final 
understanding of the mind has to be part and parcel of our overall concept of basic 
reality. This seemingly overreaching question is motivated by the inescapable fact that 
whatever conception we as human beings may have of basic reality is itself obviously and 
necessarily a product of the very minds we wish to explain. So in the end, it may be 
                                                 
1
 Indeed, in some sense it may be said that finding an unambiguous, objective statement of the Hard 
Problem would be functionally equivalent to solving it! 
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inevitable that the two are related at the deepest level. It should be emphasized that the 
motivation here is much less a metaphysical one than a pragmatic one: In particular, this 
paper will attempt to address the question: what types of consistent, physical theories of 
subjective experience are human minds capable of generating?   
 
This article takes a purposely ‗pedestrian-physics‘ approach to the mind, and tries to treat 
it as best as possible with the same methodology as it might be treated as a natural 
phenomenon within fundamental physics. Specifically, this will involve a three-step 
process of  
 
1. Addressing the observed phenomenon, rather than a presumed representation. The 
phenomenon of subjectivity at the core of the Hard Problem is precisely its 
private, ineffable appearance to the subject in a way that seems to defy objective 
description. Thus it is crucial to find a way to allow for subjective experience, not 
only as objective theoretical constructs, (e.g., as peculiar brain and/or 
computational states) but rather directly as it appears to the subject. 
 
2. Seeking an operational definition of the phenomenon. Historically, operational 
definitions have been the gold standard for constructing meaningful physical 
theories, since they force a precise definition how an object of interest is to be 
implemented in the theory. Any discourse which rises to the level of a science that 
can be shared among scientists, independent of meta-physical assumptions, 
ultimately requires operational definitions for any workable framework.   
 
3. Looking for analogies in existing theories. It seems that the mysterious 
phenomenon of subjectivity is such an unfamiliar entity within physical theory 
that any progress will likely require orientation along analogs to existing 
frameworks. Even if these analogies are purely formal, (as in, for example, the 
analogy between thermodynamics and electrical circuits) they may serve as useful 
guides and further inspiration for a more substantive theory.  
 
 
4. SUBJECTIVITY AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON 
 
If we think of the existence of the experiencing mind as an observed natural 
phenomenon, then the only aspect of that phenomenon that is directly observable is our 
own subjective experience. Everything else we believe about the mind is indirectly 
observed, or rather, inferred from behavior and other external, physical data. Indeed the 
zombie thought experiment derives precisely from this peculiar fact. Whether or not 
zombies are actually possible in this or any other world, we can only talk about them 
coherently because the subjectivity of one is not accessible to others for direct inspection. 
Of course, this is exactly what‘s frustrating and makes the mind-body problem so hard to 
deal with in the way we‘re used to dealing with other phenomena. Before giving in to 
despair, however, it‘s important to remember that this does not render subjectivity 
unobserved or unnatural, but it does mean it a priori lacks any ‗objective‘ definition in 
this sense. Nevertheless, the goal is to take subjectivity itself seriously as a natural 
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phenomenon, while resisting the temptation to a priori substitute for it a physical 
representation such as, e.g. brain states. How can this be done within the framework of 
physical theory, indeed within any formal language? 
 
Of course, there is enormous controversy on almost every aspect of the mind-body 
problem, in particular on the relationship between subjective experiences and the 
objective physical world. But whatever is seen as their causal or explanatory connection 
to the physical world, and irrespective of their semantic and ontological status, there is 
broad consensus that subjective experiences are, if nothing else, at least unambiguously 
correlated to objective physical states. That is, subjective experience is believed to 
necessarily occur when certain physical conditions are also present. With the beginning 
of the modern scientific tradition, the activity of (specifically human) brains was 
commonly seen as producing the necessary and sufficient conditions for subjective 
experience. Indeed, the goal of consciousness research within the program of standard 
neurobiology is to examine these Neural Correlates of Consciousness or NCCs (Koch, 
2004), although few still see subjective experience as strictly limited to humans. 
Alternatively, the more recent research programs of artificial intelligence (AI) and 
representationalism see the correlation of subjectivity to biological neural states as only 
one possible expression of a deeper-level correlation to the computations of a Turing 
machine. While it is disputed by Penrose and many others that computational complexity 
by itself is sufficient, it is broadly held that the salient feature for consciousness is its 
correlation to some form of physical information processing. The dualist school, of 
course, sets out from the premise that subjective and objective states are a priori 
correlated.  
 
Thus, whatever else is controversial about subjectivity, there is general agreement that 
subjective state at least correlates to some sort of physical and/or informational states. 
Within the context of a physical science, this assumption translates into requiring an 
unambiguous mapping M between whatever is identified as the space of physical states P 
with whatever is identified as the space of subjective states Q. We‘ll call this rather 
underappreciated assumption the mapping principle:  
 
 M: Q → P  
 
For the purposes of such a mapping, it only matters that the spaces P and Q are well-
defined, and not whether the states in P are intended to be ontologically ‗purely physical‘ 
(as, say, in physicalism) or ‗purely computational‘ (as, say, in AI) or some sort of 
combination of both. For convenience they‘ll all be collectively referred to from here on 
as ‗physical‘. It‘s important to emphasize that the requirement of a mapping is 
independent of whatever ontological, semantic and causal relation subjective states may 
or may not have with any physical states. That is, the mere claim that subjectivity is at 
least correlated with physical states implies the existence of a well-defined mapping 
between the two. 
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5. WHAT IS A PHYSICAL STATE? 
 
In the context of classical physics, as well as in most current philosophical discussions on 
the mind-body problem
2
, physical reality is presumed to have an ontological status 
independent of observers. With the single exception of quantum theory, this assumption 
has obviously had great power and practical value in constructing testable physical 
theories. Nevertheless, as noted above, its a priori acceptance might be an unnecessary 
limiting constraint when considering possible theories of subjectivity mental states, for 
the simple reason that such a theory, being itself a product of a mind which it seeks to 
account for, can be expected to have quite a contorted semantic and ontological 
foundation! Be that as it may, of interest here is what physical theories of the mind can be 
consistently constructed by human beings. Hence we will dispense with all such 
ontological assumptions. Here, the relevant physical space P at any given time is 
necessarily a human construction, the physical theory du jour.  
 
Call such a theory an E theory if it captures those observations and data believed by the 
theorist or community of theorists to correlate with subjective experience. Given such an 
ambiguous specification, there are in principle many choices available, largely depending 
on which observations are considered relevant. For example, in a simple computational 
neural network model of the mind, each state in P is given by the momentary connection 
strengths and on/off status of all nodes in the network. Current neuroscience considers the 
electro-chemical activity of physical neurons to form a sufficient explanatory basis, in 
which case the E theory would entail the previously mentioned NCCs. We can radically 
broaden the scope of this E theory and still stay within its conceptual foundation by 
imagining all of semi-classical physics applied to the whole subject and its immediate 
environment.  States in P would then be given by the distributions, momenta and 
valences of all semi-classical atoms within and near the organism (by the generally 
presumed chain of supervenience, this entails all the understood rules of 
thermodynamics, chemistry, biochemistry, cell biology and the like). Of course, classical 
and semi-classical physics (in non-relativistic settings) have long been supplanted by 
quantum mechanics, so in principle a purely quantum mechanical description of the 
physical state of the subject should be at least equally valid (if not manifestly 
illuminating). In this case P might be considered to be a space of state vectors |Ψ>, or 
perhaps alternatively, a relevant subset of measured observables {O1, O2… ON}. 
 
Imagining still further ahead to future physical theories, we could imagine a grand 
physics in the 23
rd
 century with, perhaps, a consistent theory of strings, loop quantum 
gravity, dark matter, warp drives, time machines, etc. But whatever the choice, the point 
is that P belongs to some theory, and as such consists of elements within some formal 
language. In other words, each element p ∈ P is represented by a string of symbols, 
which in turn can be mapped to a real number r ∈ R. So any physical state we might 
conceive of (literally) can be represented by a unique real number. For convenience, 
representations in this context will be called codes, C, and the real numbers assumed in 
binary.  
 
                                                 
2
 A significant exception is, of course, the idealist school of philosophy.  
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Physical states are, of course, generally represented quantitatively, but since most 
physical models are constructed in several dimensions (spatio-temporal and others) it is 
obviously unusual to express states as one dimensional binary sequences until they are 
coded into machine language for computer simulations and modeling. Here the 
conceptual purpose of coding with numerical/binary sequences is to more easily be able 
to apply the notions of algorithmic information theory to both physical and subjective 
states. Specifically, and towards the goal stated in the introduction, we‘ll be interested in 
the algorithmic computability of the representations of such states. In doing so however it 
is important to note that, at this stage, such a mapping to single binary sequences is 
purely a descriptive mode and does not further restrict the structure of the theory nor 
define how states evolve might in time. In particular, and in spite of using the same 
language as for digital computers, the use of a binary coding does not require that the 
time-evolution of states in P proceed via any set of well-defined algorithms. Thus, no 
condition of determinism or even causality is implied by a binary coding procedure.  
 
 
6. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF SUBJECTIVE STATES 
 
As noted, the question of just what a subjective state q ‗is‘ in the sense of its first person 
appearance to us is conceptually problematic. Nevertheless, following through with the 
program of correlating with physical state requires similarly coding each subjective state 
q ∈ Q with a unique real number as well. As previously stated, it‘s vital to note that since 
we‘re interested in mapping and eventually understanding the relationship between 
subjectivity to objective physical data, we must seek to code for the subjective state per 
se, and not for a presumed physical representation for that state. Given our natural 
human tendency to represent by proxy that which can‘t otherwise be readily conceived, 
the temptation to code for a presumed representation (such as a particular neurological or 
computational state) is great. However, such a substitution in this case would clearly be 
circular and defeat the purpose of the exercise. Any description or coding of a subject‘s 
neural, computational or other physical state properly belongs to the physical state space 
P, and not the subjective state space Q, regardless of any relationship between the two 
that may later be posited or established.  
 
As an observed phenomenon, that is, as it is actually experienced, subjectivity is 
inherently private. The inherently private nature of subjectivity forces us to accept that 
any operationally meaningful coding must be done by the experiencing subject. This is 
such an important point it bears emphasizing. One of the properties that set subjectivity 
apart from its external expressions is precisely that no one else other than the 
experiencing subject has direct access to that particular realization of the phenomenon. 
Unfortunately, such a coding then clearly requires, among other things, fairly high-level 
language and communication skills on the part of the subject(s) in question. It also 
requires a willingness to do such coding. Thus we come to the uncomfortable first 
conclusion that any meaningful operational definition that might rise to the standard of a 
science of subjectivity can only be given for a very limited number of subjects; namely 
for those that are willing and able to communicate with scientists! Initially, this seems in 
many ways completely unsatisfactory, because we naturally ascribe subjective experience 
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to a much broader set of living beings; young children, language-impaired persons, other 
primates, cetaceans, dogs, among perhaps many, many others species. 
 
Of course, the conclusion here is not that only eloquent and cooperative humans have 
subjective experiences – which I believe truly would be absurd – but the discussion 
highlights an important limitation in our ability to treat subjectivity at all within what we 
understand as a physical science. Namely, a human science of subjectivity requires that at 
least some subjects be able to communicate their experiences in a way that the scientists 
can understand, theorize, and ultimately have their own subjective experiences about. 
This by itself is not so strange; after all, given that science is a human activity, any 
science of any phenomenon requires that scientists be able to access and understand data 
considered relevant for that phenomenon. In the case of subjectivity, however, the only 
relevant, operationally definable data that is accessible are from subjects possessing high-
level language skills that are communicable to scientists. Of course, depending on the 
particular theory of mind that can be constructed on this initial basis, it seems reasonable 
to later extrapolate what is learned from such subjects to at least some other subjects not 
having these abilities. In this way we would ascribe subjectivity to a broader class of 
subjects, depending on whatever theory eventually emerges.  
 
However, in terms of methodology, no operationally definable procedure can justify this 
extrapolation: it is based solely upon our own belief that we can empathize, or share 
common experience with, these other subjects. We can speculate that perhaps this deep-
seated belief comes from the brain‘s mirror neurons which let us simulate in our own 
minds what we believe to be the experience of others (Gallese, 2001) In the case of small 
children we‘re also helped in this by our own childhood memories. Additionally, most 
can probably also imagine, if only for a few moments, what it would feel like to have no 
language available to us, and yet still have subjective experience. Of course, our ability to 
simulate in our own minds that which we take to occur in other minds gets much trickier 
with other species. The latter point is the reason Nagel‘s famous question relating to the 
issue of subjectivity ―What is it like to be a bat?‖ (Nagel, 1974) is such a compelling 
illustration of the Hard Problem. In conclusion then, we will limit our methodology of 
discussing operationally meaningful coding schemes for subjective experience to those 
subjects with high-level language and communication skills, and the willingness to use 
those skills.  
 
 
7. LIMITATIONS OF CODING WITH NATURAL LANGUAGE  
 
Of course, on a practical day-to-day level, we code our subjective experiences all the time 
with real numbers; it‘s just that those real numbers happen to be coded themselves as 
word-strings in some natural language. Word strings like ‗I‘m hungry‘, ‗I miss that look 
in her eyes whenever she ate jalapeños‘, Hamlet‘s soliloquy, and so on, can all be 
translated into binary code (and they are as soon as I type them into my laptop.) But 
whether succinct or verbose, such codes can only partially convey certain aspects of our 
experiences. Saying ‗I‘m hungry‘ doesn‘t say anything about what else is going on in my 
mind. Thus, even with articulate and willing subjects to provide input, we still have a 
 9 
problem: any natural language description gives us highly incomplete codes for 
subjective experiences. To define a state space Q, however, we‘re interested in a 
complete code of the entire subjective state q. That is, a real number C(q) that uniquely 
identifies each individual, entire experience q.  
 
One way to improve the accuracy of these subjective state codes would be to simply use 
longer descriptions to capture more information: a seven page essay on hunger would 
convey more data than the mere words ‗I‘m hungry‘. Alternatively, one could imagine 
introducing more words into natural languages, say, with each word in the dictionary 
having an arbitrary numbers of ‗flavors‘ for a more nuanced rendering of the experience 
of hunger: hunger(1), hunger(2),…, hunger(N), and any other word, as desired. However, 
while this may improve things somewhat, neither scheme is workable: few subjects will 
remember more than the order of a few thousand
 
words anyway, presumably much 
smaller than the total number of subjective experiences to be described (however they are 
defined.) More importantly, introducing more words and longer combinations of words 
create the additional complication that they take time to access from memory and 
formulate, during which the original experience has long passed. Generally, we can say 
that such a prodigious mental feat itself would, to whatever limited extent it could be 
done at all, take up so much of the subject‘s mental resources as to render the accuracy of 
the output code C(q) highly questionable in the end. That is to say, the very mental act of 
trying to code an experience accurately in this way would introduce a significant 
‗measurement error‘ in the code. While this particular example appears at first glance to 
highlight a mere practical difficulty, in fact it is illustrative of a more principle limitation 
in constructing operational definitions of subjective states. Indeed it will be seen that 
there is a fundamental and irreducible ‗measurement error‘ in defining subjective states.  
 
 
8. GEDANKENEXPERIMENT: CODING IN THE 23rd CENTURY 
 
The principle weaknesses of having a subject generate word-strings to describe his 
momentary subjective state are two-fold. First, as discussed above, the mental feat of 
juggling many words and memories introduces a large ‗measurement error‘. Equally 
important is the fact that any self-generated word-string will only address certain aspects 
of an experience, but not the entire experience itself. For example, if I look up at a clear 
sky on a warm day and have a certain subjective experience, one aspect of that 
experience I might report on is the particular blueness I perceive; another might be the 
warmth of the breeze I perceive on my face; yet another aspect might be the particular 
itch on my nose I perceive, or the faint memory of what I had for lunch, and so on. But 
this still does not amount to whatever entire experience I had at a certain instant. An 
exhaustive list of the different aspects I can report on from an experience gives a lot of 
information, but that still does not completely define the entire subjective experience 
itself. An entire subjective experience, then, is in a deep sense manifestly more than the 
mere sum of its aspects, i.e. more than reports about that experience.  
 
In order to overcome these limitations, we‘ll perform the following thought experiment, 
designed to allow the test subject to report on entire experiences in binary and only recall 
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the most recent memory state. Imagine a hypothetical 23
rd
 century neuroscientist who has 
a candidate E theory that we‘ll call E23 theory that needs to be tested on several subjects. 
Remember that E23 theory defines physical states p ∈ P which, by claim, are the set of 
states observed by the neuroscientist to be correlated to the subjects‘ subjective 
experiences. Imagine further the neuroscientist has built a ‗memory-playback‘ system, a 
device which can recreate any given physical state p ∈ P as often as needed. The task is 
now to use the memory-playback device and the E23 theory to help the subject create a 
code for the experienced subjective states. In essence, the neuroscientist and the memory-
playback system will serve as external memory devices for the subject.  
 
Note that the actually numbering of these states is arbitrary in the same sense that picking 
a reference coordinate system for measuring distance is arbitrary; what counts for the 
following is the measuring procedure. Thus the coding process begins with the 
experimenter setting an arbitrary reference state p0, and arbitrarily denoting the subjects‘ 
momentary subjective state as q0. This gives a first reference pair (p0, q0). This pairing 
may be confirmed by repeatedly generating the state p0, each time immediately 
afterwards asking the subject:   
 
‘Are you certain that your experience now is any different than just a moment ago?’  
 
Note the question references the entire experience and asks for certainty, so only a 
Yes/No answer may be given. The subject is thus reporting, to the best of his ability on 
his entire experience in binary, which will be later translated into the coding of the 
physical states of the E23 theory. Since in this instance the state p0 is repeatedly 
generated from a good candidate E23 theory, the subject should answer ‗No‘, in which 
case the new momentary subjective state, now arbitrarily labeled q’, will be said to be in 
the same q-equivalence class q as q0, written q’≈ q0 ∈ q. By definition, if the E23 theory 
is adequate, these results will be repeatable. (The need for such an equivalence class, as 
opposed to merely setting q’=q0 identically, will be described in the next section.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A 23
rd
 century neuroscientist and his thoughtful subject 
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In general, we expect that any physical state p ‗similar enough‘ to p0 will generate the 
same Yes/No response in the subject. For example, within the theory consisting of semi-
classical physics, it seems unlikely that shifting the position of a single oxygen atom 
0.1nm in the subjects‘ brain will produce a different Yes/No answer. Furthermore, any 
measuring instrument for the states p will most likely have some finite error, resulting in 
a neighborhood of states around p. Thus we need to allow for an equivalence class of 
physical states as well. We will define two states p and p0 to be in the same p-equivalence 
class p if they correlate to the same q-equivalence class q.   
 
Thus starting from the initial equivalence class pairing (p0, q0), the experimenter 
methodically varies states p until the subject first answers ‗Yes‘; that is, the subject is 
certain to feel to be in a different subjective state. Repeating the same procedure as for 
the reference pair (p0, q0) will define a new equivalence pairing (p1, q1), and so on ad 
nauseam until both the states spaces P and Q are partitioned into equivalence classes. 
Assuming the E23 theory is successful, the partition will be into disjoint classes, allowing 
a 1-1 mapping. In this case we might also, for mere convenience, arbitrarily set 
C(q)=C(p), where C(p) is a code chosen by any means deemed convenient to represent 
the class p. Note that although a particular theory was harnessed to achieve this coding, 
the procedure meets the criteria of an operational definition, since it is the subject‘s 
judgment that is ultimately used to determine the q-equivalence classes. To recapitulate, 
the E23 theory was used in three ways:  
 
1. As an arbitrary  reference system for providing subjective state codes  
2. As an external data storage and retrieval system  
3. As a theoretical framework for the neuroscientist‘s sense of understanding.  
 
Note that such an E23 theory, in as much as it connects to subjective experiences only 
through the objectively recordable binary statements Yes/No, can be treated wholly 
within the realm of Easy Problems.  At that point it may be tempting to view such a 
theory as representing the maximum amount of understanding of subjective experience 
that is achievable within any scientific program. As noted earlier, this equates to the 
position that either the Hard Problem has no solution, or subjectivity itself is not a ‗real‘ 
problem in the first place.  
 
The contrary position is that there exists a corresponding ‗H23 theory’ which addresses 
the Hard Problem. But what could such a theory look like, if by design all reportable 
information has been exhausted? Note that the above procedure for defining (p, q) pairs 
was carefully constructed to avoid the ambiguity of the subject being uncertain as to 
whether or not a given subjective experience was exactly equal to another previous 
experience. The question was phrased so that the subject gave a positive response only if 
he is certain that two experiences are different. Here it is important to emphasize the 
distinction between, on the one hand, a negative finding of not being able to report a 
difference, and on the other hand, a positive determination of being able to report that 
there is no difference. While this may seem at first to be a minor technical distinction, in 
fact it is a crucial one with broad consequences for subjectivity that will now be 
developed in detail.  
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9. THE NCD PRINCIPLE FOR SUBJECTIVITY  
 
The need for the above distinction lies with another key property I posit for subjectivity: 
that one can never determine with certainty that two entire experiences are exactly the 
same. We can glibly think of this peculiar fact as the ‗No Complete Déjà-vu‘ principle, or 
‗NCD‘ for short. Before going into this particular claim, a sidebar on general claims 
about subjectivity is in order. Historically within science, appealing to unexamined 
intuition to establish the truth of a claim has of course been just about the worst way to 
proceed; the flatness of the earth and the absoluteness of space-time would only be two 
examples of this. At the same time, any chain of reasoning must have a starting point, and 
no discussion in any field is possible without appealing to intuition somewhere along the 
line. But with subjectivity, intuition becomes indispensable in a new way, since its very 
essence is essentially visceral and private. Thus for most a priori claims about the nature  
of subjectivity, there is a priori no objective, formal proof, since we‘re literally referring 
to the way we personally experience our own ‗raw feelings‘. Indeed, the very existence of 
subjectivity itself as a phenomenon is also only viscerally meaningful to those who have 
experience themselves. 
 
Nevertheless, some statements about subjectivity can still in some sense be 
‗experimentally falsified‘ if their perceived meaning disagrees strongly with those inner 
visceral senses. Thus the claim by some that subjectivity is not ‗real‘ disagrees strongly 
enough with many people‘s direct visceral experience as to effectively refute the claim 
for them. In the particular case of the NCD claim above; if there are a number of 
individuals who feel able to tell with certainty when two of their experiences in their 
entirety are exactly the same, then the NCD principle would stand refuted.  
 
The best to be hoped for to establish such a claim is to give enough illustrative examples 
that together make a compelling case. Later I will try to bolster and demystify the claim 
by giving something of an ‗explanation‘ and a broader context for why subjectivity 
should have this odd property in the first place. For me, the case becomes compelling as 
soon as I try to imagine claiming any two entire experiences are the same—I find it 
manifestly impossible. The crucial word is entire. While many aspects of experience 
seem to clearly and readily recur (call it ‗partial déjà-vu‘), such as perceptions of certain 
sounds, colors, concepts, odors, tastes, fragments of dreams and thoughts, etc., it seems 
utterly inconceivable to me that I could ever be sure with certainty that entire experiences 
recur. Even if I try to artificially create circumstances which should repeat the same 
sensations as close as possible – a ‗self-experiment‘ if you will – my uncertainty doesn‘t 
diminish. For example, while sitting quietly, look at a some fixed object in a room for a 
few seconds, then briefly close and then open your eyes, trying to look at the same object 
in the same way both times. Focus on trying to recreate the same conditions within 
yourself each time, until you aren‘t able to report any clear difference between each 
experience. But at the same time I claim you will notice starkly that you‘re not able to 
claim with certainty that those experiences are exactly the same in their entirety. One can 
try many more examples, some with physical animation that focuses special attention on 
the experience: e.g., sitting quietly at a table, clear your mind as much as possible. Then 
pound your right fist at a fixed angle on the table. Rest, relax, clear your mind for 10 
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seconds. Repeat and immediately compare your two experiences in their entirety. Again, 
I claim the same result in this and all cases. 
 
 
10.  AN UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE FOR SUBJECTIVITY  
 
Once this point has sunk in, the justifiable question is: Why should this be, and what can 
be so similar about two experiences that you can‘t report a difference, yet so different that 
you can‘t claim they are equal either? Is this just a ‗psychological artifact‘ of our 
naturally conservative uncertainty in light of the well-known vagueness of memory? But 
remember there may be little or no uncertainty when comparing individual aspects of 
experience, such as comparing shades of color or sounds, and these must also be recalled 
from memory. For example, when a particular color is flashed on a screen, then 
immediately afterwards the same color is flashed again, or when the same musical tone is 
played twice, there seems to be no such ambiguity. Why can‘t the same level of certainty 
be achieved for entire experiences?  
 
To use a physical metaphor: ultimately it seems the uncertainty in comparing entire 
experiences stems from the inability to ‗grasp‘ each entire experience the way we seem to 
be able to ‗grasp‘ individual aspects ‗within them‘. For example, I am much better able to 
‗grasp‘ a shade of blue than I can ‗grasp‘ the entire experience in which I am, among 
other things, seeing a shade of blue. Ultimately ‗grasping‘ a particular aspect of an 
experience means putting it in some sense ‗within‘ another experience that serves to 
examine that aspect. In the case of aspects, I seem to be able to put a particular aspect of 
one experience into another experience with complete fidelity. But how do I put an entire 
experience within yet another entire experience for examination? The act of trying to do 
so already alters that experience to be examined, so that the ‗fidelity‘ of reproducing it is 
lost, since I can‘t control how that experience is ‗embedded‘ or in which experience it is 
‗embedded‘. This requires and indeed creates a new experience. Thus, our inability to 
claim with certainty that any two experiences are equal, far from being some 
‗psychological artifact‘, seems rather due to the fact that comparing experiences 
unavoidably alters them enough to create an irreducible uncertainty. Thus we see the 
inherent (and frustrating) limitation of any E23 theory is that, while it incorporates all 
reportable information of an experience q, it is still incapable of adequately addressing 
the entire subjective experience as an actual experience. Is it principally possible to go 
beyond this, i.e. to have anything like theory of subjectivity itself?  
 
One theme that runs through the above discussions is that the very act of trying to 
produce a code for subjective experiences inevitably creates what we can properly think 
of as a ‗measurement error‘. Regardless of whether we‘re satisfied with an E23 theory in 
which the subject can only give a Yes/No answer to create equivalence classes, or 
whether we want to try to code beyond this, in each case the subject needs to reflect on 
the experience and place it ‗within‘ another, new experience. Therein lays the inescapable 
rub of any meaningful operational definition of subjective experience: this mental 
‗measuring‘ act of introspection itself creates a new and different experience (namely that 
of reflecting on and coding for the memory of another experience). Thus the very act of 
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coding an experience invariably alters the original state in question in an uncontrollable 
and unpredictable way. It is clear that this error is irreducible and part of the 
measurement process itself. In obvious analogy to Heisenberg‘s principle for quantum 
mechanics, I‘ll refer to this situation as an ‘uncertainty principle’ for subjective states.  
 
In light of such a strong claim, it should be repeated that just as Heisenberg‘s principle 
can‘t be proven as a theorem within classical physics, but rather introduces 
fundamentally new physics into the mix, the principles proposed here for subjectivity 
can‘t be proven within the context of any purported E23 theory. As noted earlier, claims 
about subjectivity rely particularly on this kind of ‗non-syllogistic‘ evidence. 
Nevertheless, as with Heisenberg‘s principle, I believe that examinations such as those 
above make a compelling case for establishing new conceptual tools for subjectivity. In 
the following we shall see that the analogy with Heisenberg‘s principle can be pushed 
quite far, mirroring many of the structural elements of quantum theory. 
 
 
11. MODELING SUBJECTIVE STATES AS INCOMPUTABLE NUMBERS 
 
One approach to modeling subjective states in line with this principle is to treat each state 
q as being inherently unique and irreproducible. This in turn may be readily achieved by 
modeling any real number C representing the state q as being algorithmically 
incomputable. Representing subjective state codes {CH} of an H23 theory as 
incomputable numbers, as esoteric as it may seem, reflects in a natural and intuitive way 
some of the properties we have been ascribing to the very peculiar nature of subjectivity, 
and how subjectivity is related to and differs from reports of subjectivity. In particular:  
 
1. No finite algorithm can ever make the determination that two incomputable 
numbers are exactly equal. From the NCD principle, whereby there is no 
procedure for establishing the equality of two experiences, this is precisely what 
we expect of {CH}. At the same time, one only needs to examine a finite number 
of bits to determine when two incomputable numbers are different numbers (one 
need only examine until the first bit where the numbers differ). Again, this is 
mirrored by the observation that two experiences that differ in at least one aspect 
(such as seeing a slightly different shade of blue) can be distinguished from 
another within a finite number of steps.  
   
2. Incomputable numbers are not recursively constructible from any computable set. 
However, any incomputable number may be approximated to any desired 
precision with a computable number. This property of {CH} expresses the sense 
that subjectivity cannot be uniquely ‗captured‘ by reports, however much 
information is conveyed in them. In a metaphorical sense, subjectivity as it is 
experienced is ‗incompressible‘; ‗its own shortest description‘—often used 
terminology in describing incomputable numbers. 
 
We may further think of the relationship between an H23 theory, which takes into account 
this irreducible uncertainty of its states q, and its corresponding E23 theory, which does 
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not, as analogous to the relationship between a quantum theory and its corresponding 
classical limit. In particular, any E23 theory, whatever other type of incomputability it 
may or may not contain, is at least free of the above type of incomputability since it is 
defined in terms of equivalence classes which, by construction, ignore uncertainty in the 
coding process. Call the codes for these E23 theory classes CE(q)=CE(p) as defined 
earlier. We could then imagine writing the codes CH(q) for an H23 theory when q ∈ q as 
some function T of the corresponding E23 theory codes  
 
CH(q)=T(CE(q), µ), 
 
where µ is an incomputable number and T is a function with the property that  T(CE(q), 
µ)=CE(q) for the (counterfactual) case µ=0.  
 
To summarize this heuristic picture then, we may imagine something like this as the 
relationship between an E23 theory (reports of subjectivity) and an H23 theory 
(‗subjectivity itself‘): Subjective states of H23 theory are not constructible from the 
reports of subjective states of E23 theory, but at the same time, E23 theory may be said to 
offer an effective approximation of H23 theory. 
 
 
12. A BELL-LIKE INEQUALITY FOR SUBJECTIVE STATES 
 
The analogy with quantum theory can be brought forth at the ontological level as well. 
Prior to the modern interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of state spaces/path 
integrals and probabilities, Heisenberg asked how position and momentum were actually 
measured as classical variables in experiments; essentially how they are operationally 
defined. In these thought experiments it became clear that such quantities have an 
irreducible error that derives from the very act of measurement itself. From the vantage 
of modern interpretations of quantum mechanics Heisenberg‘s principle, as originally 
stated, was developed around a counterfactual, namely the convenient fiction that 
electrons actually have well-defined positions and momenta at all times, and that these 
follow classical trajectories disturbed by the measurement process. However, the results 
of EPR-type experiments over the past decades have strongly implied that observables 
such as electron position and momentum are merely the outcomes of measurement, and 
have no meaningful values until such a measurement takes place. The difference between 
this ontological view and the competing hidden variables views is generally accepted to 
be expressed in Bell‘s inequality, which generally holds for observables O having some 
hidden variable parameterization O(λ). Although this ontological interpretation is still 
controversial in many circles, the observed violations of Bell‘s inequality are now usually 
accepted to imply a violation of local reality.  
 
But be that as it may, we don‘t have to enter into the long-standing interpretational debate 
in quantum theory to hypothesize that an analogy with the same sort of ontological 
framework as might be useful in a theory of subjectivity. As has been shown, the states q 
themselves are not measurable, but rather only their q-equivalence classes q. In addition, 
the incomputability of subjective states codes C(q) means a priori they can have no 
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‗hidden-variable‘ parameterization q(λ). Perhaps it is more fruitful to see such states q, at 
least insofar as they are measured to be the q-equivalence classes, to be more the results 
of our ‗mental measurements‘, i.e. observations, rather than meaningful ‗entities‘ whose 
ontological status is independent of their ‗measurement‘.   
 
Indeed it is possible to write an inequality of the form analogous to Bell‘s theorem as 
follows. In this presentation we follow a simpler version (Harrison, 1999) more 
conveniently amenable to the present discussion.  Consider a set of objects to be sampled, 
and three properties A, B and C, that can be measured from each object. Each property 
can be measured to have the value 0 or 1. However, for each object only two of the three 
properties are measured at each sampling. Consider further the functions FAB, FBC, FAC 
computed from each such pair-wise measurement as follows: 
 
 FAB =1  if A=1, B=0 
      =0  otherwise 
 
FBC =1  if B=1, C=0 
      =0  otherwise 
 
 FAC =1  if A=1, C=0 
      =0  otherwise 
 
Let E(FXY) be the expectation value FXY over many measurements. If each of the 
properties A,B,C has some ‗hidden variable‘ parameterization A(λ), B(λ),C(λ) with some 
frequency distribution ρ(λ), then it is straightforward to demonstrate the inequality 
 
E(FAB) + E(FBC) ≥ E(FAC). 
 
The ‗hidden variable‘ parameter λ specifies that each quantity is ‗locally real‘ in the sense 
that for a given λ, the quantities A, B and C actually do have well-defined values, 
whether they are measured or not. If on the other hand, in an EPR-type experimental 
setup, where A,B, and C represent, for example, measurement of pairs of entangled 
spin(1/2) particles along three different axes, respectively, then this inequality is known 
to be violated, (as is indeed required by quantum mechanics). Hence nature at a 
microscopic level violates ‗local reality‘ in this sense of hidden variables.  
 
Applying this line of thought to subjectivity, we may imagine our previous 23
rd
 century 
experimental setup with the neuroscientist equipped with an E23 Theory and generating a 
specific (p, q) equivalence pair for a subject. Each time the subject is asked to report on 
two out of three specific aspects A, B and C from the entire experience. (For example, if 
the subject reports seeing a certain shade of red, then A=1, and 0 if otherwise. When 
reporting a certain musical tone, then B=1, and 0 if otherwise. Similarly, reporting a 
certain smell gives C=1, and 0 if otherwise.) The experimentalist then computes over 
several repetitions of the equivalence pair (p, q) the expectation values E(FAB), E(FBC), 
E(FAC) as defined for the functions above. Again, if there exists a parameterization of 
A(λ), B(λ),C(λ), then the aspects are ‗locally real‘ in the sense of having actual values for 
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each measurement and the expectation values must satisfy the same Bell-type inequality 
as above. On the other hand, we have seen that the code CH(q) for subjective state q upon 
which the aspects ultimately derive from is itself an incomputable number, and hence has 
no parameterization. Thus it is not a priori clear that such a parameterization for A, B and 
C must exist in all cases.   
 
Indeed, one can hypothesize that there exist certain neurological test scenarios and some 
set of aspects A, B and C such that only two of the three may be reported on per ‗mental 
measuring act‘. To take an arbitrary example, it might be that under certain 
circumstances, the act of focusing and reporting on both a certain color and a certain 
sound together dominates the mental resources in a manner and to the extent of 
preventing one from reporting on a certain smell, and so on. If in addition, the reported 
value of any given aspect varies depending upon which other aspect was also reported on, 
then the inequality can be readily violated. A concrete realization of this would be the 
following hypothetical table of measurable outcomes
3
: 
 
If report on A,B:  Then either (A=1, B=1), or (A=0, B=0 or 1) 
If report on B,C:  Then either (B=1, C=1), or (B=0, C=0 or 1) 
If report on A,C:  Then either (A=1, C=0), or (A=0, C=0 or 1), 
 
which, (as long as A=1 for at least one A,C measurement pair) results in 
 
 E(FAB) + E(FBC) < E(FAC) 
 
Such a case violates the condition of ‗local reality‘ in the sense that aspects A,B,C cannot 
be said to have had values until they were ‗mentally measured‘.  
 
It is worth noting that one can create a plethora of macroscopic test situations that also 
give the above or similar measurement outcomes, and in this sense violate ‗local reality‘. 
For example, a test subject could simply willfully decide to report the above outcomes 
upon being so queried. Alternatively, a simple logic circuit could readily be built to create 
the same result. Violations of Bell‘s inequality in other macroscopic and also in certain 
cognitive settings have also been discussed previously (Aerts, 2000). However, of 
particular interest here is whether such an inequality could be violated given repeated 
measurements with fixed (p, q) pairs. Such violations, if observed, would be of singular 
significance for both the theory of cognitive processing as well as the ontological status 
of subjectivity and how it relates to physical reality. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 While the above example is purely hypothetical, a more concrete future experiment might be envisioned 
in the context of synesthesia, the neurological phenomenon in which stimulation of one sensory or 
cognitive pathway involuntarily causes the experience of another sensory mode. (e.g., experiencing colors 
associated with certain numbers and/or sounds.) 
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13. ONTOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVE STATES 
 
It has been argued throughout that the ontological status of subjectivity is problematic.  
On the one hand from every day speech to psychology to neurobiology it seems quite 
natural and compelling to speak in an unproblematic way about ‗subjective states‘ q. On 
the other hand, there are profound conceptual reasons to be skeptical of the 
meaningfulness of this notion. First, we should be suspicious from the fact that, as we 
have seen, only the q-equivalence classes can be given an operational definition. Even 
more problematic than operational definitions is the elementary question of just what a 
subjective state – as a representative of the phenomenon of subjectivity – is supposed to 
mean in the first place. Whatever subjectivity is, it is clearly and profoundly different 
than literally anything else we‘re used to talking about. In fact, talking about the ineffable 
sensing we call subjectivity as if it were an element of a set at all seems at bottom to be a 
subtle, albeit very hard to avoid, misappropriation of language. Clearly the noun 
‗subjective state‘ tries to refer somehow to the first person perspective within us. In 
saying it that way, we apparently mean it to be something like what we mean by a 
‗thermodynamic state‘ or ‗neurological state‘. But subjectivity‘s defining essence seems 
inherently un-capturable with any word-descriptions. In using the noun ‗feeling‘ to try to 
communicate, we are merely objectifying experience, i.e. creating a noun for it as a false 
place holder, because that‘s all we have at our disposal.  
 
The very nature of language as a tool for creating and communicating representations of 
our subjective experience seems to make it profoundly ill-equipped to deal with the 
essence of subjectivity itself. Seen in this light, the proposed use of incomputable 
numbers to represent subjective states might be seen as something of a compromise 
between the two horns of a profound dilemma: on the one hand, science requires 
language representations to go about its basic business, yet is called upon to address that 
which ultimately has no language representation. Incomputable numbers may be seen in 
this context as sitting in the middle between these two competing requirements, in as 
much as any representation given is at best a ‗place holder‘ for a number which also has 
no representation by any finite symbol string.  
 
 
14. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
 
It‘s clear that 21st century science is not even close to a workable E23 theory, let alone an 
H23 theory. Nevertheless, from the present analysis it‘s possible to at least eliminate 
some types of theories that are incompatible with any H23 theory. In particular, it has 
been argued that a proper operational treatment of subjectivity implies that all subjective 
states q can be represented by incomputable numbers. Thus any deterministic physical 
system whose states are all necessarily computable (from any computable initial 
conditions), such as classical physics, is ruled out as subvening on any future H23 theory. 
Currently the only widely accepted physical theory that provides a framework for truly 
nondeterministic processes is, of course, quantum theory. However, this observation is 
not to imply that quantum theory as currently formulated is a physical foundation of 
subjectivity. Indeed, incomputable functions are not explicitly contained within the 
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current formalism of quantum theory. Furthermore, it is far from clear what direct, 
explanatory relevance quantum theory might have. On the one hand, Penrose has argued 
that the output of at least some mental processes is necessarily nondeterministic (Penrose, 
1989). Along these lines it has been hypothesized that such nondeterministic processes, if 
they exist, might be driven by macroscopically relevant quantum entanglement occurring 
within the microtubules of neurons within a theoretical framework dubbed Orchestrated 
Objective Reduction (Hameroff, 1996). On the other hand, Tegmark has argued in detail 
that the quantum decoherence time scales are orders of magnitude too small for any such 
processes to be relevant to cognition (Tegmark, 2000). In any event, it‘s fair to say that 
there are as yet no clear theoretical or experimental indications of a role for quantum 
processes in brain functioning. For the moment, it may be best to view the analogy with 
quantum mechanics as a heuristic one that can provide useful analogies and partial 
insights into what a future H23 theory could look like. What the elements and formal 
structure of such a theory might be, and in particular, whether quantum theory might 
nevertheless, in principle, be more directly connected conceptually to subjective 
experience, will be the topic of ongoing investigations.   
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